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A STUDY
lieves "her voice (to be) the harmony of the world," and one has
the strong feeling that he would not dissent too much from the rest
of the statement:
[A]ll things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as
feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her
power: both Angels and men and creatures of what condition
soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with
uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and
joy.
A Study of 'The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals'
-Arno C. Becht*
"I preach the neglected beauty of the obvious."'
The chief object of this review is to give an accurate idea of the
contents of Professor Llewellyn's book, The Common Law T'adition:
Deciding Appeals, thus supplying a general background for the other
articles. The perfect review, for this purpose, would eliminate all
personal reactions of the reviewer, but there are reasons why this
ideal is impossible. The mere processes of selection and emphasis
require some exercise of discretion, and, moreover, the book provokes
responses which will probably show through to others even though
they are unconscious. I have tried to compromise with the problem
in this way: Part I is devoted to a quite extensive survey of the book,
and in this I have suppressed my reactions as much as I could, (not
entirely) and have let the author speak for himself a good deal of
the time. In Part II I have tried to convey some impression of the
book as a whole, an operation that obviously requires more subjective
methods, and Part III is a collection of frankly personal comments
which are offered for what they are worth and which may also serve
to discount the less overt evaluations that have affected the rest of
the review.
As the book, excluding the index, is 535 pages long, a review of the
contents can only be a skeleton. Skeletons appeal to hardly anyone's
sense of beauty, and they look a good deal more alike than complete
bodies do. Hence, so far as the book has attractiveness and individu-
ality, this review will inevitably misrepresent it unfavorably. Since
the professional audience to which the Law Quarterly is addressed
will allow for this as a matter of course, I would say nothing of it,
but the problem is more complicated than condensations usually are.
* Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. LLEwsLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADrrIoN: DEcmING AP.PALs 339 (1960)
[hereinafter cited only by reference to page].
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Professor Llewellyn has courageously addressed himself to a task of
systematic evaluation, an undertaking so full of pitfalls that scientists
pride themselves on avoiding it, and this review must emphasize the
various steps in this evaluation. But the evaluations as they appear in
the book are illustrated, documented, backed up-the skeleton has
a lot of flesh on it-and all this is, unfortunately, what the reviewer
who is producing a summary must leave out. Without it, Professor
Llewellyn may appear as a dogmatist, a generalizer, given to purely
personal value-judgments, which are then represented as truths for
all times and circumstances. I must ask the reader not to attribute
to Professor Llewellyn what is only a book reviewer's necessity. The
error would be only a little more if one tried to form an impression
of H mlet from a reviewer's statement that the Prince had a time
making up his mind to kill his stepfather, but finally managed to do
it.
PART I
The book begins upon a depressing theme, the failing confidence
of all of us in our courts, and not merely in the Supreme Court of
the United States, but in the courts of the states as well.2 This disease
is not the same as the criticism that has always attached itself to
courts, and, worst of all, it has new and disastrous effects on the
practicing lawyer:
In most it no longer inspires healthy fighting reaction to effect
its cure; for most it has come to lay a pall and palsy on heart and
hand because it goes to whether there is any reckonability in the
work of our appellate courts, any real stability of footing for the
lawyer, be it in appellate litigation or in counseling, whether
therefore there is any effective craftsmanship for him to bring to
bear to serve his client and to justify his being.3
He immediately explains, however, that this crisis has no justifying
cause, that the courts in their daily work earn and deserve confidence
which lawyers withhold because they do not fully appreciate how
law develops in a case system. His brief statement of reasons for
this conclusion is also his outline or table of organization of his book.4
The author begins his principal exposition by recalling briefly how
developments in logic and psychology destroyed the image of legal
certainty in the 1920's and 1930's, without, however, contributing
much to the reconstruction,$ pauses to emphasize that "certainty" is a
matter of degree,6 and passes to the study of fourteen factors which
2. Pp. 3-7.
3. Pp. 3-4.
4. Pp. 4-7.
5. Pp. 11-16.
6. Pp. 17-18.
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constantly exert pressure toward steadiness in the work of appellate
courts.7 Here he discusses, for example, "legal doctrine",, and "a
frozen record from below," 9 factors which from day to day channel
the decisions of a court and curb tendencies toward uncertainty,
carelessness or bias in its work. It is characteristic of the author's
mind, that almost every one of the discussions has its "per contra"
section, a recognition of other qualities that reduce the steadying
effect. "Legal doctrine," for example, often affords authority for a
decision either way, and a court sometimes senses and reacts to facts
not reproduced in the "frozen record." The demonstration, in short, is
not a Euclidean proof, holding good for all cases, but a careful
practical assessment.
The thirteenth factor, "The General Period Style and its Promise,"'01
introduces a contrast between the "Grand Style" and the "Formal
Style" in deciding cases and drafting opinions, which, as it is one of
the pervasive themes of the book, is worth special notice. The "Grand
Style" (the phrase refers to the work, not to the writing)"1 obviously
cannot be described easily, but it refers to the practices of trying to
satisfy both the written rule and the justice sensed in the occasion,
of refusing to put a case under a rule when the reason for the rule
does not comfortably fit the case, and of constantly improving the
rules as the cases provide new insights. 12 This style prevailed in
American judicial work in the period of "Marshall, Kent, Cowen,""
and others. In the "Formal Style," which began to develop in the
1880's :"
[T] he rules of law are to decide the cases; policy is for the legisla-
ture, not for the courts, and so is change even in pure common
law. Opinions run in deductive form with an air or expression
of single-line inevitability."
The clarity and certainty which appear on the face of the opinion in
the formal style actually create confusion and uncertainty, because
they conceal the necessary creative work of the judges, and force
them to do it hit-or-miss.10 This manner of work, which long dom-
inated American law, began to decline, in some places as early as
7. Pp. 19-61.
8. Pp. 20-21.
9. P. 28.
10. Pp. 35-45.
11. P. 36.
12. Pp. 37-38.
13. P. 36.
14. P. 38.
15. Ibid.
16. Pp. 38-40.
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1905 ;'7 in the period since it has largely lost its authority. But the
courts, though they have rejected the formal style, have no clear
notion what ideal they are aiming at, while the bar in general does
not understand the change and attributes it to arbitrary action in
office or to incompetence. 8 Actually, the possibilities of accurate
prediction have greatly increased, once the bar understands what
to look for.19
The most important of the steadying factors is the influence of
"Professional Judicial Office" on the man who holds it.20 Though
this has also its "semi-contra"' 21 in the vastly differing personalities
of our judges, the office exerts a constant pressure toward faithful
handling of the precedents, toward honesty, and toward impartiality.
Perhaps the most striking component of the forces creating this
pressure is the fact that the judge is not expected to be "passive."
"[T]he judge must be seeking, as best he can, to see the matter fairly,
and with an eye not to the litigants merely, but to All-of-Us as well."' 2
It is time to recall the sentence from the book with which this re-
view begins: "I preach the neglected beauty of the obvious.'23 For
most of the other individual points in the book are obvious in the
sense that these factors are. That is, they are as obvious, and as
forgotten, as the pressure of the atmosphere, without which our bodies
would explode, but whose cumulative effect we take for granted. And,
since we are dealing with ideas, there is more; even the man who is
consciously aware of them, rather than thoughtlessly reacting to
them, is not apt to articulate their effects and values with precision.
The author's turning over familiar stones and calling attention to
what lies under them is one of the book's greatest merits, and the
one that it is easiest to overlook.
The establishment of the steadying factors only begins the author's
work, for the bar's doubts about our courts persist in spite of them.
It is best to quote the author's own summary and comment:
Here, then are ten to fifteen clusters of what we may see as
flywheel factors making for steadiness and reckonability in
American appellate judicial deciding in contrast with any general
type of group-deciding, factors which if they have any power
should be expected to produce a degree of depersonizing in the
deciding far beyond that when such flywheel factors are not
17. P. 41.
18. Pp. 42-44.
19. Pp. 44-45.
20. Pp. 45-51.
21. P. 49.
22. P. 46. (Author's emphasis.) See pp. 46-47.
23. See text accompanying note 1, supra.
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present. With such clusters at work one can, as has been re-
peatedly indicated, hope to get further down in than merely into
the large and the long. "Steadiness" of our appellate judicial
decision over the decades, as it has been so often praised, is good
for historians of culture or of government, but it affords to the
person with pending litigation comfort as chilly as that which
an economist's secular trend offers to a businessman contemplat-
ing a particular venture. Our factor-clusters whisper hope of
something vastly different: a wherewithal, perhaps, of wrestling
in prospect with the outcome of the concrete appeal in hand. We
thus set ourselves against the wail of bar and public which has
been waxing steadily stronger, in anger or in anguish, over forty
years.2 4
There follows a discussion of the arguments which are used to show
that court work is arbitrary and unpredictable, and an explanation of
the way in which the author proposes to meet them.25 The funda-
mental materials of the answer are found in judicial opinions, but
there is one thing that the author does not expect to find there: "of
course, only by happenstance will an opinion accurately report the
process of deciding. Indeed, I urge flatly that such report is not
really a function of the opinion at all .... ,,20
I think it is proper for a reviewer to enlarge a little here. Some of
the venom in the attacks on judicial opinions was drawn from the
contrast between the appearance of close reasoning in the opinions,
and the trial and error processes by which difficult decisions, in or out
of the law, are actually reached. Professor Llewellyn, I think, is
dis-associating himself from attacks on this ground even when they
are aimed at the formal style, little as he himself likes that style for
other reasons. His position is that the opinion should, and now
usually does, state the grounds (of fact, rule, principle and policy)
of decision, and that it should usually not (and usually does not)
recount the often blundering and tortuous processes by which those
grounds were chosen.
What, then, does the author expect to find in the opinions? He
contends that the comment on prior cases, the stating of the facts,
the phrasing of doctrine, and many more things, give the "top bracket
of the bar"27 bases for predicting future action. These men, by 1925:
had begun to read any current case of interest not only for what
it had laid down in words as doctrine or principle, nor only
further (or in contrast) for what it had actually and narrowly
24. P. 51. (Author's emphasis.)
25. Pp. 51-61.
26. P. 56.
27. P. 57.
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decided, but for the "flavor" that could indicate how far that
court, tomorrow, would stand to today's decision, or would
expand it.28
The author explains that in his study of the cases he will bring out
chiefly two things: (1) how they deal with precedents, and (2) "the
importance in the deciding process of considerations of sense, de-
cency, policy, wisdom, justice .... 1-29
"Justice" has an ominous sound in a lawyer's ear. It takes good
nerves for one with Professor Llewellyn's drive for clarity in reason-
ing to admit this as one of his working concepts, and the more so
when he is concerned with case law and not with general jurispru-
dence. He begins his approach to the concept by suggesting that the
words "fair," "right," or the minimum "only decent,"' 0 are closer to
the appellate judge's work than "justice" is. Then he adds:
What is of interest, what is crucial in this regard, is that such
words and the idea they carry can hardly reach and register
unless they come all impregnated with a lrelatively concrete go-
ing life-situation seen as a type. The next aspect of the crux is
that, in a going life-situation, fairness, rightness, minimum de-
cency, injustice look not only back but forward as well, and so
infuse themselves not only with past practice but with good prac-
tice, right practice, right guidance of practice: i.e., with felt net
values in and for the type of situation, and with policy for legal
rules. The crux is completed by the obviousness that this drives
the whole "justice" idea, inescapably in some part (I think, in
prime part) forward, into prospect, not merely retrospect: into
what one can perhaps call the quest for wisdom in the decision.31
This notion, not of the unique situation, but of the situation type, that
is, of the aspects of this situation that are typical of others, is, I
think, not merely the useful substance of the "justice" concept, but
the key-concept of the book. Numerous questions of justification and
definition are apt to occur to the reader at this point. I have some
questions and comments which will be mentioned in Part III,11 but
the author does not so much concern himself with these problems as
with illustration of the value of the conception in the critique and
analysis of cases 3 I think it is safe to generalize this far: the
"situation-type" is not only a guide in determining how to decide the
case, and how broad a generalization to rest it on, but also a warning
28. Pp. 57-58.
29. P. 59. See pp. 58-59.
30. P. 60.
31. Ibid. (Author's emphasis.)
32. Part III, headings 2 and 3, infra.
33. The only philosophic base suggested for the conception, I believe, is a brief
passage from Goldschmidt, which is quoted in the text at note 63, infra.
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not to judge the particular case too exclusively in the light of its
special (non-typical) facts.
One of the characteristics of the grand style is its full awareness
and use of the techniques available for handling precedents. In the
next section, "The Leeways of Precedent," the author first explains
that part of the discontent with the courts results from misunder-
standing of the doctrine of precedent,34 and then turns to a study of
American courts in the period of the grand style. He considers cases
from New York in 18423, and from Ohio in 1844,36 which, though
taken from consecutive pages of the reports chosen at random
(except to make sure that Cowen's work was represented) ,37 ex-
emplify the method of the grand style at work. His conclusions
about Ohio will show what he was looking for and what he found
germane to his argument:
It is a short sample: ten cases, only twenty-two pages of opinion
in 13 Ohio (the rest of the report is counsel's argument). Yet
in this tiny sampling we turn up (compare the modern varieties
illustrated below at pp. 77 if.).
1. Following, in three or four varieties.
2. Avoidance clearly seen as a technique available, and testing
by reason used (though no avoidance or restriction actually oc-
curs except on statutes, and though no overruling is suggested).
3. Expansion or fresh start constantly in play. 8
After noting earlier studies of the freedom inherent in the pre-
cedent system (Wambaugh and Black), 39 and explaining that the
leeways make precedent, "a system of guidance and suggestion and
pressure, and only on occasion a system of dictation-'control,' -140
the author turns to one of the most valuable parts of his work. In a
short passage of fifteen pages41 he offers an organized collection of
the ways in which precedent may be treated by a court. The com-
plexity of what is often spoken of as a single doctrine is made plain
by the listing of sixty-four separate techniques, while the author
observes at the beginning that his list is "above all incomplete." 42
The collection is broken into three main headings: (I) deals with
"Following Precedent" and contains thirty-two techniques. These in
turn are divided into four groups of eight each. One group shows the
34. Pp. 62-64.
35. Pp. 64-68.
36. Pp. 68-72.
37. P. 64.
38. P. 71. (Author's emphasis.)
39. Pp. 73-74.
40. P. 75.
41. Pp. 77-91.
42. P. 76.
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controlling powers of precedent, another the choices a court retains
while it abides by precedent, a third "the Simpler Types of Creation"
43
in which a court can indulge though staying within precedent, and
the last the powers a court has to expand or change direction while
not altering official doctrine expressly. Under (II), "Avoidance of
'The Decided,' "4 the author collects sixteen methods under four
headings containing four each; the first two of these have each four
legitimate and four illegitimate techniques for avoiding a precedent
without taking "Responsibility to the Future."41 Then he has four
methods of narrowing or limiting a precedent, and four more for
"killing" 46 it. Under (III) he has sixteen methods, eight under the
heading "Fresh Starts from Old Materials," 47 and eight under "En-
larging the Standard Set of Sources or Techniques. 48
This imposing gathering of methods for dealing with precedent
gains by the fact that the author appends footnote references to
illustrate each one, but the persuasive effect comes chiefly from the
fact that the reader recognizes all as familiar, though he could not
readily produce an illustration of many of them. The author himself
appeals finally to this ultimate as his best evidence.40 While no item
in the list is unknown to a lawyer ("the neglected beauty of the
obvious"), the cumulative impact of the collection, its implications
about the amount of freedom that exists inside the doctrine of
precedent, may be quite new and may require a re-examination of
his fundamental attitude toward both courts and law, with further
implications for his own practice. The point is driven home by brief
summaries of recent cases in three states, Pennsylvania in 1944, New
York in 1939, and later, and Ohio in 1953.50 The conclusion is best
expressed in the author's own words:
The little case, the ordinary case, is a constant occasion and
vehicle for creative choice and creative activity, for the shaping
and on-going reshaping of our case law.-
All of this emphasizes the point that precedent does not decide
cases independently of judges or even force them to their conclusions,
but rather channels them, confines them between rather wide (com-
fortably wide) banks. But channels are boundaries. They influence
43. P. 80. See pp. 80-82.
44. P. 84.
45. Ibid.
46. P. 87.
47. P. 88.
48. P. 90.
49. P. 92.
50. Pp. 92-100.
51. P. 99. (Author's emphasis.)
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and limit action. In a random sample from Illinois the author notes
that there were thirty-nine simple citations of earlier cases as
authorities, and only fifteen illustrations of the other techniques 2
Test samplings showed that the simple citations of earlier cases as
authority were accurate 3 and that settled doctrine has, for many
reasons, a strong power to control the courts.5 4
The crucial point is now ready to be made: even as the courts
follow precedent, they create from day to day:
For the long haul, for the large-scale reshaping and growth of
doctrine and of our legal institutions, I hold the almost unnoticed
changes to be more significant than the historic key cases, the
cumulations of the one rivaling and then outweighing the crisis-
character of the other.55
Within the technique of "following," a court can not only create new
law,56 but it can reverse a trend,5 7 it can shift the meaning of a word
or concept" or change its attitude, especially in the classifying of the
facts of cases. 5
Beneath what looks on the page as "mere" following, beneath
what I shall argue to feel and seem, in the main, to the very
deciding court itself to be such "mere" following, there swirls
a constant current of creation.60
Professor Llewellyn's reasons why this creation is either unconscious
or quickly forgotten are interesting but not vital to the argument.61
For further pursuit of his thesis the author now recurs to his key
concept, the "situation-type. '62 This is the means by which he be-
lieves that courts can and do adjust the law to individual situations
without making bad law:
Much less frequently phrased is the differential impact of the
facts of the individual case and the facts of the situation taken
as a type, the distinction on which I have already insisted, and
which I shall have to stress throughout.... I doubt if the matter
has ever been better put than by that amazing legal historian
and commercial lawyer, Levin Goldschmidt: "Every fact-pattern
of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in, carries
52. Pp. 100-01.
53. Pp. 101-06.
54. Pp. 106-08.
55. P. 109.
56. Pp. 108-13.
57. Pp. 113-14.
58. P. 114.
59. Ibid.
60. P. 116.
61. Pp. 117-20.
62. Pp. 121-57.
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within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is
a natural law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature
of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason
can recognize in the nature of man and of the life conditions
of the time and place; it is thus not eternal nor changeless nor
everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very circumstances
of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in uncovering and
implementing this immanent law."
63
It happens that this quotation from Goldschmidt is the only explicit
reference in the book to what I would call a "metaphysical" base or
justification for the doctrine of the situation-type. This is not sur-
prising, nor is it a ground for criticism of the author. For one thing,
he did not set out to write a book on "legal philosophy," and for
another, as long as the grounds for a position are made explicit, as
they are here, a writer is not to be blamed for not attempting a
demonstration of them. I shall hereafter refer to the doctrine of this
extract from Goldschmidt as the doctrine of "immanent law." (I
have something more to say of this in Part III).6
The first sentence of the last quotation (not translated from
Goldschmidt) is a reminder of the importance of the distinction be-
tween the special facts of the case being decided and its typical facts.
After the quoted passage, Professor Llewellyn uses three illustrations
taken from developed bodies of law, not from his random samplings,
to show how the situation-facts explain what may otherwise appear
to be arbitrary decisions,65 and, after some pages of further com-
ment,66 passes to a consideration of random samplings from New
York in 1939, Pennsylvania in 1944 and Ohio in 1953.7 In all of these
he finds evidence of the grand style, though Pennsylvania lags behind
the other two courts in its development and shows as yet no signs
of understanding the importance of reflecting upon the type-situation
before it attacks the case being decided.68
There follow a few pages of summary of the argument this far.06
The latter part of this may usefully be quoted. After summarizing
his illustrations of development even in the cases that merely follow
precedent, he says:
From this one might derive a first suspicion that the lines of
any probable movement on the occasion and for the occasion
63. P. 122. The passage from Goldschnidt is apparently translated by the
author, from the German.
64. See Part III, heading 3, infra.
65. Pp. 122-26.
66. Pp. 126-35.
67. Pp. 135-54.
68. Pp. 147-48.
69. Pp. 154-57.
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might be given in, foreshadowed, almost forecast by the situation
in suit. Argument and illustration then combined, to distinguish
type or problem-situation and its sense and equity from the
peculiar or "fireside" appeal of the individual controversy or
parties, and to urge-though again on selected material-that
the situation-type could sometimes be seen by way of the opinion
to be at work in shaping the decision and the rule. But the
argument was made and stressed that the situation, however
eloquent, could operate only insofar as its eloquence could reach
ear and understanding of the particular court or judge.
The question was then explored whether this appeal of the
facts-distinguishing the type of situation from the particular
case-could be traced by a blunt eye, producing homely and per-
suasive evidence available to most folk, as a usable tool in
spotting what has been influencing certain appellate courts in
their actual deciding. This time the cases were not selected,
they were taken as they came: from New York, 1939; Pennsyl-
vania, 1944; Ohio, 1953. And I remind that Ohio and New York
had also been sampled from a century and more back, to make
clear the honorable age of the tradition .7
It is clear that after this summary the author has completed one
definable part of his task: he has isolated what ought to be looked for,
he has proposed a criterion (the situation-type) that identifies it,
and he has shown that what he is looking for can be found and
recognized in varying degrees both in cases a century old and in
modern cases. He has yet to show that the grand style and the use
of situation-type reasoning are common enough phenomena amongst
our courts to warrant a belief that an understanding of them will
produce reasonably accurate prediction of appellate results. All of
this, both exposition and criticism, might be dismissed as a set of
evaluations that are merely personal to the author. But if one is
convinced, as I am, that the criteria are valid, and that a reliable
judgment on these questions is important, he might still hesitate over
the question how the next demonstration is to be made. One common
method, the statistical, seems impossible. It would either require so
many delicately differentiated categories that its figures would be
nearly meaningless, or a thousand crucial differences would be smoth-
ered by lumping cases into large groups, with implications that would
mislead because of the concealed differences. The author's method
seems the best possible one to me, though it is evaluative and thus
open, of course, to attack on that score. He selected three eastern
states, three southern states, three in the middle west, three on the
west coast, and three from the center and southwest. He chose
current series of cases from each state and read until he had found
four "which overtly used situation-sense in the testing or shaping of
70. P. 157. (Author's emphasis.)
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the rule applied." 71 How typical this sense was in a jurisdiction
would be indicated by the number of cases it took to find four that
used it. If four turned up before the court's judges had been reason-
ably represented, more cases were read. The studies of three of the
states appear in full, in the body of the book 7 2 and there are eight
more full studies and four summaries in an appendix.7 0
In the text at this point the author finds substantial evidence of
situation-sense in Mississippi, an unusually high degree of it in
Washington, and little or none in Alabama. In the appendix he says:
Of my current samplings I should regard only Alabama's
supreme court as inconsistent with my basic thesis on constant
overt use of sense to shape the rule...; I should regard Indiana,
Missouri, and even Kansas as off-line for major persuasiveness.
Each of these last is, nevertheless, entirely consistent, even mildly
favorable. And there are eleven samples out of the fifteen which
are striking and conclusive. Something is present, at work, and
significant, in the appellate judging of our country.
On the ranging of the authority techniques, there is no ex-
ception.7 4
Missouri is one of the states treated in summary,5 and the author
finds it "for the general theses of this book . . close to neutral, if
one omits (as for purposes of proof one must) the pervading, per-
sistent flavor." 715
Professor Llewellyn turns now to a practical question: is this array
of techniques actually available to the average practicing lawyer?
For if it is not, its existence would help only a peculiar few. His
conclusion is unequivocal:
I submit that the average lawyer has only to shift his focus
for a few hours from "what was held" in a series of opinions
to what those opinions suggest or show about what was bothering
and what was helping the court as it decided. If he will take
that as his subject matter, I submit that the average lawyer can
provide himself, and rather speedily, with the kit of coarse tools
we have been discussing and with evidence, too, of his own ability
to use that kit to immediate advantage 7
In the next section he generalizes from the data thus far presented:
(1) that rules guide, but do not control decisions; that some, however,
come closer to control than others ;78 (2) that when the rule applied
71. P. 158.
72. Pp. 160-77.
73. Pp. 469-507.
74. Pp. 469-70.
75. Pp. 505-06.
76. P. 506. (Author's emphasis.)
77. P. 178. (Author's emphasis.)
78. P. 179.
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fits the situation-sense, the use of the sense as well as the rule not
only makes the ground of decision clear, but indicates the direction of
future development ("The Law of Compatibility") ;79 (3) that when
the rule applied does not fit the situation-sense, prediction "depends
on factors apart from rule, sense, or both"80 ("The Law of Incom-
patibility") ;81 thus, "probability in prediction will vary with the
technical excellence of the rule itself ... "' ;82 (4) "A rule which wears
both a right situation-reason and a clear scope-criterion on its face
yields regularity, reckonability, and justice all together" ;83 ("The
Law of the Singing Reason") .1 But such rules are rare.
The rest of this passage is a profounder study of the causes of that
"crisis of confidence,"115 with a description of which the book opened, 86
but now in the brighter light of the data and studies developed in the
book, and with strong insistence upon the point that the crisis is
unjustified. In one passage the author says:
What is the utter barebones for viable appellate judicial work
is first fourfold and then threefold: (1) Uprightness; (2) a
modicum of judgment-neither wild men nor fools must dom-
inate the bench; (3) a modicum of reckonability of result; and
(4) that reckonability must in some material degree transcend
the persons of the personnel. That is the fourfold aspect, one of
objective substance. The threefold is this, one of subjective atti-
tude: not only (1) must these things be there and at work, to
the knowledge and in the feelings of the judges, but (2) the
general public and, perhaps especially, all but unreasonable
litigants must feel their presence, and (3) the bar must know
them to be there. The present crisis has afflicted in first in-
stance the bar, but it has for at least a decade, perhaps for more
than two, been seeping through the bar out into a much wider
public which for lack of wherewithal to do constructive or re-
medial thinking is helpless and a bit pitiable in its trouble.87
A little later this description of criterion and fact is followed by this
conclusion:
The material shows, and I assert it shows beyond possibility of
refutation, that the crisis lies wholly in the second, the threefold,
the subjective, the attitude area.... On the objective side of how
the work is being done, each one of the elements is open to huge
betterment, of course, and needs the same, and needs it plenty;
79. P. 180.
80. Ibid.
81. Pp. 180-83.
82. P. 181.
83. P. 183.
84. Pp. 183-84.
85. P. 198.
86. Pp. 184-99.
87. P. 195. (Author's emphasis.)
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but not a single one of them is absent, and each stands well above
the barebones level. Nor do I think that any other craft of our
law, taken as a whole and taken in the light of what is offered
the craftsmen to work with, is coming as close to turning out
a proper job as is our appellate bench.88
The next section, "Reckonability of Result: Sense and Reason
Again,"'89 recurs to the "steadying factors" which, operating upon
the judge, tend to make him behave in predictable ways, and then
stresses the power of counsel, by appealing to situation-sense, to
induce judges to take new directions when these are shown to be
desirable. His evidence in this section consists of analyses of the New
York cases on sealed contracts,90 and on foreign remittances,0 1 in
which the courts were persuaded to move away from prior decisions
or language by the pressure of facts whose influence could have been
foretold if one were sure that able counsel would present them effec-
tively.
The various factors making for stability and change are brought
together in a section entitled "Appellate Judging as a Craft of Law." 0
If "certainty," which is impossible and undesirable, is narrowed down
to "reasonable regularity of decision,"' 3 if judicial discretion is ex-
ercised "with a feeling, explicit or implicit, of willingness, of readi-
ness, to do the like again, if, as, and when a like case may arise,"0 4
if the leeways, broad or narrow, are used as much as they are needed,
and not when they are not needed, 95 and if the lawyer reads with
awareness of the "atmosphere" of the cases ("The Law of Fitness
and Flavor"), 96 prediction with reasonable accuracy is possible. The
various steadying factors now appear again in combinations, the
known group on the bench, the record with "frozen facts and issues,"0 "
with the qualifications upon their powers as prediction-guides; situa-
tion-sense remains the chief guide in hard cases:
For prognosticator and for advocate the principle remains:
if sense looks in more than one direction, you have to capture the
way in which the court will see and judge sense; and even then,
if the choice before the court is a hard choice, it continues a
chancy one.98
88. P. 199. (Author's emphasis.)
89. Pp. 200-12.
90. Pp. 206-08.
91. Pp. 208-12.
92. Pp. 213-35.
93. P. 216. (Author's emphasis.)
94. P. 217.
95. Pp. 219-22.
96. Pp. 222-23.
97. P. 226.
98. P. 232.
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This entire passage" is a most instructive practical summary of the
guidance that can be found in intelligent use of the factors previously
developed.
The functional values of the points made are summarized and
brought to bear differently in a short but useful section on the advo-
cate's use of them in briefing and arguing a case. 00 I cannot forbear
quoting one passage which, although the consideration of the advocate
is outside the main stream of the book, illuminates the meaning of the
situation-sense better perhaps than any other:
[T]he sense of the type-situation, where it can be tapped, out-
ranks and outshines any "fireside" stuff. It has been mentioned
that situation-reason can normally come with credentials (though
of course under handicap) even though no material has been
inserted into the record below. It has also been suggested, and
should now be stated roundly, that the strain and pull on emo-
tion and on the sense for justice which a type-situation can exert
has a flavor and effect like that of a smooth but strong ocean
current in contrast to an undertow. Its steady pull may go unno-
ticed, in any event it is unresented and can readily go unresisted,
for it speaks to what is the right rule of law, or the right legal
concept, or the right application or a wise extension or limitation
or subdivision: these are things traditionally proper for argu-
ment, and for pondering, in terms of probable results outside
the immediate case; they are flavored with the court's own judi-
cial quest for wisdom, they are familiar, their help is welcome.
Against this, the passion or sentimentality of the particular case
is as disturbing or upsetting as an undertow, an appellate judge
feels moved to, and does, lean and dig in against it, if he can.
It may prevail, yes; but it is not an advocate's business to jam
resistors into his chosen circuit.'0 '
In short, the advocate, when he can, should avoid stating his case in
terms of fireside equity because this straightway reminds the court
that hard cases make bad law. Of almost equal interest is the follow-
ing passage considering the advocate's course when the settled rule,
or even worse, a singing rule, is against him. His illustrations of the
techniques that have been successfully used to overturn or avoid such
rules is instructive.10 2
The next section is a long discussion'0 ' of "Conclusions for Courts."
As this has twenty numbered sections and numerous related headings,
summary is obviously difficult. (1) It begins with an attack upon the
(probably rare) illegitimate conscious ignoring or misrepresentation
of inconvenient authority, which weakens the confidence of the bar,
99. Pp. 224-35.
100. Pp. 236-55.
101. P. 245.
102. Pp. 245-50.
103. Pp. 256-398.
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and which, in these days when re-working and even overruling prec-
edent is accepted, is unnecessary.104 (2) It passes to the observation
that situation-sense has been developing as a technique, 10 to which
he appends a warning that this "is not suggested as a cure-all. It is
not a cure-all. No technique or method can ever be a cure-all."'10
Moreover, a court using it must constantly be on guard against mis-
leading by clever counsel:
Roughly speaking, the best safeguard against counsel's mis-
painting lies in visualizing the hands-and-feet operations in
the picture, seen as a going scheme, a working setup. Such
operating aspects are curiously hard to fake; one thinks of the
standard advice of the old storybook detective to his junior: for-
get the impression, look at the "roots" of the "beard."101
He considers under this heading the managed series of cases, frequent
now in the federal courts and not unlikely to develop in the state
courts, indicates the merits of this practice in presenting cases to the
courts in a meaningful sequence and against a pattern of background
facts, but suggests that, to guard against misleading, the court, when
it sees such a series developing, should assign one of its members to
study the field especially.
(3) The next section,1 8 with a wealth of illustrations, exhibits the
advantages and the dangers of the situation-type as a form of reason-
ing. It is, first, the correct way to take account of and make effective
the "fireside" equities of a case, if any allowance can be made for
them at all. It is not merely an attempt to abstract from the facts of
the particular case:
It is instead to insist that a court should seek to channel the
impetus from the concrete, to channel it into a search for a
situation-pattern of significance which can be somewhat worked
over for its general sense and tendency so as to test the wisdom
of letting the equities of the fireside prevail or even count; and
if they should be so permitted, then to capitalize their poignancy
or illustrative power to produce a bit of sounder law for that
whole situation. 0 9
On the other hand, the situation-type is not simply a device for per-
mitting the fireside to take over the case, and its use always involves
the risk that the court may make a mistake in choosing the situation-
type:
104. Pp. 256-60.
105. Pp. 260-68.
106. P. 261.
107. Ibid. (Author's emphasis.)
108. Pp. 268-85.
109. P. 270. (Author's emphasis.)
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However, it will not do to leave the impression that under
sound method the particular case equities simply do and should
take a circuitous route through some convenient type-situation,
only, at length, having all along been the material motivation,
to realize themselves in a happy holding. Neither will it do to
create the impression that adopting any type-situation which
the case equities may happen to whistle into court will comport
with the use of sound method."10
This means that the court may frame too broad a generalization, or
one that is wrong in some other way; also, if situation-sense is
properly used, the fireside equities may go unprotected. It may show
that they should not be given any weight, or that they cannot be
protected without undesirable consequences.
Once in a while, situation-type reasoning may lead a court to pro-
cedures which, though desirable, are uncommon. One of these is the
"area clean-up,""' in which the court straightens out and if necessary
codifies a series of cases which are apparently in conflict, or in which
there is doctrinal confusion."' The other is to admit the defect in the
rule that the trial court correctly followed (on the precedents), to
make a change in the rule, but to find on other grounds no need for
reversal in the case being appealed. 3
In (4) the author contends that technical procedural errors should
not be held reversible unless they affect substance, using "the whole
case as the test."" 4 In (5) he suggests that distinctions of prior
authority should not be made unless they are sensible, and that
"modification or . . . overruling" 115 are preferable to unconvincing
distinctions. He then devotes some pages to the proposition that the
opinion is one valuable tool for overcoming the present distrust of the
judicial process. One of his practical suggestions is that the courts,
generally faithful in pointing out to losing counsel why his points
failed, should, more often than they do, indicate to winning counsel
why his argument convinced, permitting him the public recognition
which is his due for sound work.116
Under (6) constant "correction and recorrection' ' .7 of the rules,
the author's own words should be quoted:
110. P. 272.
111. P. 281.
112. Pp. 281-82. See State v. Chaney, 349 S.W.2d 238 (Mo. 1961), in which
Chief Justice Hyde provided a neat "area clean-up" which, because of dissents and
concurrences in result, obtained only two other votes. Judge Storckman, though
agreeing in result, thought that the case demanded a "fresh start," and proposed
a totally different method of approach.
113. Pp. 282-83.
114. P. 285.
115. P. 287.
116. Pp. 287-91.
117. P. 291. See pp. 291-94.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The betterment thus has two phases, related always, yet
rewarding separate consideration. The one is goal-stuff: to
locate and focus for seeing the most significant working situa-
tion-types, and then to smell out and shape for seeing and thought
the lines along which, in any situation-type, the rightnesses of
conduct and solution travel, so as to further the immanent goals
of that situation in its relation to the whole of man and cul-
ture .... 118
The other phase of the betterment is that of measures. Rare
indeed is the situation in which our legal measures are as well
adapted to our goals as we could wish: that fact will not down.
Moreover, every slightest shift of goal throws up at once the
question whether the measure also may not need immediate
appropriate modification."19
After commenting on the conditions that oppose re-examination, he
observes that he is not proposing radical investments of time:
The cure does not lie in chasing far and further. Where it lies
is in never failing, each time, to take at least one fresh look.
The new prodding of the new facts may bring something better
into focus. The queer subconscious may this time be ready to
give up an out which has been cooking down in there since the last
time the court walked through these legal sandburs. 120
And finally, he gives it as his judgment that this attitude is a common
one: "Once again, this seems to me to sparkle unmistakably from our
samplings as what the appellate courts today are busy doing, and
doing rather well.' 21
(7) There is, in fact, a collection of "procedures"'122 which the
courts now follow sometimes and which, if they were followed all the
time, would greatly improve the quality of the law.12 3 Courts should
search their own past cases, not merely for the rule, but for the
instruction they can gain from the facts of past cases and from the
reason or reasons for the rule. Study of the reasons given in other
state courts is more valuable than "'weight of authority' nose-
counts."' 24 Against the objections that these would add to the demands
on the courts' time and also to the length of the reports, he urges
that there are compensating economies that would more than make
up the difference. The syllabus, if it were written first, and carefully,
by the judge writing the opinion, would probably shorten the opinion.
118. P. 292.
119. Ibid.
120. Pp. 293-94. (Author's emphasis.)
121. P. 294.
122. Ibid.
123. Pp. 294-98.
124. P. 296.
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Moreover, the "area clean-up," or the less ambitious "rule-tidying,"125
saves time for everyone by giving the law a "fresh start1126 and mak-
ing it unnecessary to labor through the earlier cases any more. For ex-
ample, of Cardozo he says:
As he grew more experienced, the drive grew in him to leave the
older authorities tidied up behind, to make each little opinion,
in its own little way, a clean fresh start. I find in the work of
Holmes on the Massachusetts bench no such pervading flavor.127
Moreover, this kind of working over the authorities makes it less
likely that a judge will violate the law of "fitness and flavor. ' ,28
(8) Another device for improvement is "advance notice of im-
portant change in doctrine. ' 12 9 This ranges from the warning often
given in opinions that the court is not deciding a case or cases differ-
ent in specified ways from the one at bar, to outright overruling.
Much of the discussion in this section is a strong defense of the
practice of prospective overruling, which protects the parties who
have relied upon the old rule, while it warns all others that the rule
will be changed. Perhaps the strongest defense of overruling, which
I do not remember seeing before in a generalized form, is this:
It may be that in 1840 or 1850 there was some sense in arguing
and feeling that the decision about to be reversed was just a
mistake, to be corrected. But that is not, four times out of five,
why cases or rules are overruled today. Today they are over-
ruled typically because although they were good law once, and
in their day have served a decent purpose, conditions have
changed around them until their service has run out. Today's
overruling does not one time in five uncover the true rule the
court should have seen two or three generations back. It con-
sciously declares, instead, a new rule for new conditions, a rule
which in the older days would have been dubious at best. 3°
(9) As a related technique, the author suggests that "when a rul-
ing has novelty, or its desirable range is still cloudy, or no means has
been found to cut the issue down to tolerable or comfortable
scope . . .,"31 the court should make "deliberate provision of an
alternative ground for the decision."'' 2 This is advisable caution:
Now the chanciness of light from the case is proverbial: beside
every "leading ease" which has illumined sit five or ten "cases
125. P. 294. (Author's emphasis.)
126. P. 297.
127. P. 298. (Author's emphasis.)
128. Ibid.
129. Pp. 299-305.
130. P. 305. (Author's emphasis.)
131. P. 306.
132. Ibid. (Author's emphasis.) See pp. 305-09.
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of first impression" which instead of being followed got them-
selves done over. The chanciness of light from counsel has not
achieved proverb-status because its importance is not yet proverb-
clear; but it is a chanciness which flickers like a candle in a fitful
draft. Look: there are the overskilled counsel who slant the
needed knowledge; there are the underskilled counsel who know
not even that background, situation, and immanent law have
meanings; and, worse than either, there are the bison who smash
up the china in half-suspicion that it might be important. 3'
Next follows a series of headings which, as they chiefly concern
the practical possibility of realizing these advantages in a court's
work rather than the theoretical values of the advantages themselves,
cannot be usefully summarized, though they should be referred to.
Thus (10) points out that a judge, even under pressure of heavy work,
can select some cases for special treatment,'3 4 and (11) suggests that
a court as a whole should plan its work so that the areas which need
clean-up or tidying surely get it.13 In (12) he considers the ways of
avoiding real or apparent inconsistencies when a court sits in panels,16
and in (13) he recommends to supreme courts the practice of relying,
entirely or in part, in opinions of lower courts when they are good.
In this discussion he addresses himself to the related question whether
a court should borrow language from a brief of counsel, and offers
the following comment:
As against the adoption of lower court opinions, that savings
and profit which lies in the lifting of seductive passages from
counsel's briefs is a more delicate business. But I do not see it
as a dubious one, once the court has reached its conclusion about
the soundness of the passage. Quite the contrary. On the other
hand, here I see little or no gain to be had from overt acknowl-
edgment, except by accident. Explicit credit for a course of
thought, a line of argument, a body of material, is one thing: such
credit is good to give. Counsel's phrasing seems to me another
matter. It is offered to the court as a gift, but it may be a Greek
gift, it calls for scrutiny. If such a gift, after scrutiny, proves
acceptable, the court can properly assume dominion.137
In (14) he enthusiastically approves the rapidly growing institu-
tion of "the judge's law clerk." l 8 The following section, (15) deals
with the troublesome problem of the outside expert.13" The "amicus
brief" is considered here, but the problem, as he sees it, is broader.
133. P. 309.
134. Pp. 309-11.
135. Pp. 312-13.
136. Pp. 313-17.
137. P. 321. See pp. 317-21.
138. P. 321. See pp. 321-23.
139. Pp. 323-32.
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court once cleared a blocked docket by using
members of the bar to prepare tentative opinions, and this spectacular
innovation raises the greater issue of when and how much a judge can
consult an expert out of court. One practical objection to such
consultation, of course, is that counsel have no chance to argue new
points that the expert may bring up. The author suggests:
It seems to me therefore that a sound hedge, not wholly complete,
yet adequate, offers by spreading the nature and effect of such
material on the face of a proposed opinion, the court remaining
open to reargument addressed to that material. Precisely the
same holds, of course, for any decision which is placed in part
on any basis dug up by the court itself, but which is theretofore
new to the case. Reargument is indeed in my view wisely limited
to situations where the showing of its probable value is cogent;
but the entrance of such a new element surely lays a good founda-
tion for such a showing.'-,
But what risks are there that the expert might be wrong? The author
suggests four possible kinds of error. 14 1 In his discussion of the
expert's possible "lack of balance,"'': of which he has a splendid
example, 4 3 he observes that the judge who consults must not, on
account of this risk, limit the expert's function in "interpreting,"
which, indeed, is one of the prime benefits to be hoped for from the
consultation, but must be on his guard against unconsciously biased
interpretation.'"
In (16) he concludes that "expert courts" (e.g., Workmen's Com-
pensation, Probate) are valuable for first hearings and first deci-
sions. 1' 1 But what seems to me to be one of his most important con-
clusions occurs in his discussion of a related point. He strongly
favors a system that brings appeals, at least in the last resort, to the
supreme court of the state:
[I]t still seems to me that increasingly as technological complex-
ity piles high, our ancient institution of ultimate review by those
complete nonspecialists, the general Supreme Court, stands out
as one of the wisest institutions man has thus far managed to
develop. 1 6
In a short but important section on rules (17) ,'1 he observes that
a rule is not fully a rule unless "its sphere and criteria of application
140. P. 325. (Author's emphasis.)
141. F. 327.
142. Ibid.
143. Pp. 328-30.
144. P. 331.
145. Pp. 333-35.
146. Pp. 333-34. (Author's emphasis.)
147. Pp. 341-45.
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achieve a moderate clarity."' 48 He attacks again the mental attitude
revealed by the remark so commonly made in trouble cases, that the
rule is clear and only its application gives trouble. The belief that
this can be true only distracts a court from realizing that the rule is
not clear. The author offers this generalization: "A formula which
does not guide its own application is not as yet a rule of law at
al-.-- . . '149 In such situations lists of factors for use in deciding
application, and, better still, with indications which way each factor
points, are real progress toward a rule-they are at least a beginning
of exploration in the area in which the rule is needed.
In a long section (18) on the scholar"0 the author notices with
approval the increasing willingness of courts to use texts and period-
ical articles in their decisions, but his characteristic determination
to look at both sides nowhere shows to more advantage than here,
where he himself has something at stake. First, it will be unusual
when a book or article "wholly relieves an appellate court of its burden
of creation." 15' Second, scholars, even scholarly judges, sometimes
blunder as badly as anyone.5 2 Third, the scholar may either (1)
offer a mistaken suggestion that seems to follow necessarily from
sound doctrine, or (2) pin on a conclusion that does not properly
follow from his material. Careful reading will detect the latter
error ;153 the former is apt to result from an overconcern for order,
and is harder to allow for. The author points out that what may
seem to be merely a "hard case" which should be prevented
from making bad law, is more likely than not a "hard rule"
which, even if courts may pay it lip-service, is apt to be avoided
by one means or another, thus creating real uncertainty under a
facade of certainty.'5 4 The cases that depart from the principle, at
such times, should be carefully studied, for the scholar has probably
missed situation-type points that need to be taken into account in
framing the doctrine.,5 Incidentally, he warns of the perils of
snobbery that beset scholars, and criticizes their too frequently
supercilious attitude toward the courts. 55 The section ends with a
strongly worded argument to lawyers that the reports are valuable
148. P. 343.
149. P. 344. (Author's emphasis.)
150. Pp. 345-62.
151. P. 347.
152. Pp. 347-48.
153. P. 348.
154. Pp. 349-52.
155. Pp. 352-53.
156. Pp. 354-55.
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for them as literature, as instruction, and as a source of valuable
fact-information about society.157
The section on scholars ends with the observation that they and
courts are "allies willy-nilly"'' 58 in producing order in the law. In
section (19) the author shows, using form or "boiler-plate"' 15 9
agreements as an illustration, how far this alliance has been useful
in solving very difficult problems, and how it might have been and
might yet become more useful still.16°
(20) One deficiency of this review which is known to the reviewer,
is its failure to make clear to the reader the extent of the author's
interest in the ways of courts with statutes. These ways are fre-
quently considered in the discussion, but the book's chief concern is
with method, which has made it difficult to bring out properly the
occasions on which the methods are applied to statutory material, for
the difference in material, after all, is of secondary importance.
Fortunately the last of the numbered sections6i is devoted to the
treatment of statutes, which offers an opportunity partly to correct
my error. It opens with the following passage:
This book is not, as a book, about how our State supreme courts
do deal or ought to deal with statutes. Yet again and again, in
order to avoid misinterpretation, I have had to insist that the
range of techniques correctly available in dealing with statutes
is roughly equivalent to the range correctly available in dealing
with case law materials.162
He refers at once to Appendix C163 in which he reprints a collection
of precepts for statutory interpretation arranged in neatly contra-
dictory pairs. For example, the first pair has, on the one hand, the
principle that "a statute cannot go beyond its text," and, on the other,
the principle that, "to effect its purpose a statute may be implemented
beyond its text."164 To the earlier publication the author here has
added another set of nineteen precepts from the federal courts, of
which twelve deal with the use of legislative history and other materi-
als in the interpretation of statutes. When one considers the court's
power to invoke either partner of these pairs, with no stated guide to
tell which of the pair will be used in any case, the general formula
about legislative intent becomes illusory. The author, quoting from
one of his own earlier writings, takes the position that when the
157. Pp. 356-62.
158. P. 361.
159. P. 362.
160. Pp. 362-71.
161. Pp. 371-82.
162. P. 371. (Author's emphasis.)
163. Pp. 521-35.
164. P. 522.
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legislature is conscious of the error to be corrected, has a goal in
mind, the "legislative intent" formula has a meaning, but not other-
wise:
On the one hand there are the ideas consciously before the drafts-
men, the committee, the legislature: a known evil to be cured,
a known goal to be attained, a deliberate choice of one line of
approach rather than another. Here talk of "intent" is reason-
ably realistic; committee reports, legislative debate, historical
knowledge of contemporary thinking or campaigning which
points up the evil or the goal can have significance.
But on the other hand-and increasingly as any statute gains
in age-its language is called upon to deal with circumstances
utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage. Here the quest
is not properly for the sense originally intended by the statute,
for the sense sought originally to be put into it, but rather for the
sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of the new situa-
tion.1 65
This is followed by a study of the statutory techniques shown in the
Ohio cases of 1939, which concludes:
I have not attempted to exhaust these three hundred pages.
It is already clear that both in initial approaches to the meaning
of a statute and in the ways in which the court's own prior con-
struction are handled, this single sequence of cases, decided at a
single term of court, displays a versatility of techniques which
is strictly comparable to our familiar correct techniques with
ease law authority.16
The author's most interesting conclusion on this general question
is, that the rigid manner of thought characteristic of most decisions
in the formal period survived longer and more dangerously in the
statutory cases. The courts are more likely, in his opinion, to produce
decisional and literal nonsense in such cases on account of the notion
that they lack power to take situation sense into account. He believes
that the work of both Cardozo and Frankfurter shows the effects of
this notion. The results are serious:
This has three important consequences. The first, already
mentioned, is a certain jerkiness in the handling of statutory
material. It is much less easy than with pure case law to foresee
whether, how, and how far situation-sense will break through;
and the art of effectively accommodating needed sense-meaning
to the given statutory material of authority is (as contrasted with
the ease law art) still a crude art, sometimes a rude one. It is
indeed both sobering and saddening to match our boisterous ways
with a statutory text against the watchmaker's delicacy and care
165. P. 374. (Author's emphasis.)
166. P. 377.
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of a theologian, or of a Continental legal craftsman, or even of
a good American lawyer when the language he is operating
with is that not of a statute, but of a document.
The second consequence flows out of the first: cumulative shift
seems in the statutory field to be harder to bring into order and
relative forecastability than in the case law areas. 17
The third consequence is that, in contrast to the relative freedom they
have won from the formal style in case law, the courts revert to it
in statutory cases, and thereby depart from the essence of their ideal.
I cannot see how some of the things done to statutes (though in
good causes) by noncitation or by disregard of word, phrase, or
clause can fail to rasp the gullet even of the prescribing physi-
cian. If some horrendous result is treated as the letter seems to
demand, that is a different matter: it leaves the high image of
duty bravely but pitifully faced. But the duty of accounting
which an appellate court owes to the given authorities cannot with
either decency or wisdom be ignored; so that the responsibility
for making situation-sense out of the statutes (an obligation
which the appellate courts are insistently and with increasing
regularity facing up to) carries with it a responsibility no less,
both in the guild and in the individual craftsman, for developing
the art of handling frozen language up toward a level comparable
with the current art of handling case materials. 16
The section ends with this conclusion: "For the rest, the court's
work is not to find, any more than it is with case law. It is to do,
responsibly, fittingly, intelligently, with and within the given
frame."16'
The first part of the book ends with a series of brief discussions of
special points. The book's use to the counsellor, for example, is not
as obvious as its use to the appellate lawyer, but it is useful, neverthe-
less, in planning his ground safely.17 There is a careful, and very
moderately phrased, critique of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the light of the conclusions reached in the body of the book.' 17
Part II is a group of studies illustrating and documenting the points
made in the previous discussion. It opens with a section on Mans-
field,17" in which his commercial insight into a negotiable instruments
problem is shown, followed by an account of the later twisting and
warping of his doctrine as his insight, the reason of his rule, was lost.
As one of the principal errors occurs in Swift v. Tyson, 73 there is a
167. P. 380.
168. P. 381.
169. P. 382. (Author's emphasis.)
170. Pp. 382-84.
171. Pp. 384-93.
172. Pp. 405-29.
173. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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discussion also of the difficulties engendered by the overruling of the
federal common law doctrine in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.174 And, in
preparing for another consideration of situation-type, the author takes
a decision of Judge Cowen (for whom he has a very high regard)
which is very unpopular nowadays-his holding in Hartfield v.
Roper,"5 that a child is barred in an action against a third person,
by the contributory negligence of his parent-to show that even in
this now repudiated decision Cowen carefully supported his rule with
reasons drawn from the contemporary American situation. Even so,
the rule might have been wrong when it was laid down-the im-
portant point is that its reasons accompanied it, which reduced the
chance that it might be misunderstood or misapplied.
This account of Cowen in action introduces a further discussion of
the situation-type, addressed to the question of how broadly the
situation is to be taken by the court, in framing its rule or doctrine
for the case. The difficulty of the situation-type as an instrument
is that it has no definite principle for guidance in the solution of this
problem. As the author points out:
No rule or principle can ever, in such a choice, tell any court, in
concretely definitive terms, what scope "the" problem-situation
before it has, or, more accurately, is best made to have. There is
a line of guidance, but it speaks only to conscience plus judgment.
That line is: "the" problem-situation extends as far as you are
perfectly clear, in your own mind, that you have grasped the
picture fully and completely in life-essence and in its detailed
variants, and therefore know it to present a significantly single
whole, and one over which your knowledge and judgment Iave
command. That far, it is wise to deal with it, and right to deal
with it, because small things take on fuller meaning in the con-
text of greater ones. And also because the law does well to trend
into ever larger unities, so long as they remain meaningful as
they grow. But those unities must be and remain meaningful,
over their whole scope, in terms of life and sense, not merely in
terms of formula and "sound," else they do harm. That is why
a court is doing its duty when, contrary to the sense you see and
desire, but with clear consciousness that it understands what it
is doing and why, and with clear statement of both, it goes to
bat on the whole of a broad situation.
But that is also why any doubt about whether the court has
the whole situation in sure grasp is to be resolved by the court
always in favor of a narrower rather than a wider scope.170
This is followed by a section on Cardozo,177 showing him once in his
best form, and twice in bad. The purpose of this contrast is to show
174. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See pp. 415-18.
175. 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1839).
176. P. 427. (Author's emphasis.)
177. Pp. 430-45.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss1/1
A STUDY
how Cardozo's powers failed when he happened not to grasp the
situation-type in the case he was handling.
The text of the book closes with a discussion of the current situation
from several points of view,17 8 which includes an anecdote from Justice
Rutledge, a close consideration of the court's witness cases in Illinois,
and some comments on dissents and on the style of written opinions.
Of the three appendices, A179 and C18 have already been summarized,
and I reserve comment on B till the second part of this review.
PART II
As part of the effort to see the book as a whole, I will begin with
Appendix B,181 in which the author considers the legal realist move-
ment and its critics. He clearly affirms his attachment to the move-
ment; in fact, more:
And I put this book forward both in its plan and on its descrip-
tive side as a solid and unmistakable product and embodiment of
American Legal Realism. I should indeed like to use the book
to shame either old critics of the movement or later ones.182
On the other hand, he immediately insists, realism was not a phi-
losophy, and was never meant to be one, though some of its exponents
may also have had philosophies of law. It was, and it is, a method
only:
Of all of these things, only "see it fresh," "see it clean" and
"come back to make sure" are of the essence. They go to method.
That method is eternal. That is point 1. The method may have
come into first discussion among lawyers in relation to rules andjudicial decision, but it is no more limited to that area than it is
to matters legal. It applies to anything. That is point 2. But the
method includes nothing at all about whither to go. That is point
3. Realism is not a philosophy, but a technology. That is why it is
eternal. The fresh look is always the fresh hope. The fresh in-
quiry into results is always the needed check-up.'8 3
And he goes on to show that some of the best products of realism are
incorporated in regulations, briefs, casebooks, and even in the
practices of an attorney general. These things are not regarded as
"jurisprudence," and are not taken into account in assessing the
movement. But they show that the contribution of realism was not
178. Pp. 446-68.
179. See text accompanying notes 74-76, supra.
180. See text accompanying notes 163-64, supra.
181. Pp. 508-20.
182. P. 509.
193. P. 510. ( uhnr's eripha-.)
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in its wilder declarations, and especially not in its denials of this or
that, but in the clarifications and sound results that its practitioners
managed to produce in their own work.
All this is consistent, for if realism is a method, and only a method,
the only place to study it is in action. I do wonder a little whether all
partisans of one or another variety of legal realism would whole-
heartedly accept the author's resigning every claim to its being a
philosophy. And, of course, he has made no effort in this book to
canvass the literature and answer all the realist arguments that might
be brought against him. But the point of chief interest is, that he
intends his book as an exemplification of the only value that realism,
in his opinion, should claim-that of method.
In the realist controversy Professor Llewellyn seems to be a moder-
ate. On the one hand, the formal style appals him. Any compromise
with that is unthinkable. On the other hand, he does not stand with
Oliphant, for instance, who thought the judicial opinion nearly use-
less as a guide.184 No, Professor Llewellyn believes that the judicial
opinion is a very helpful guide if, but only if, it is read rightly, and
he thinks that words can give a great deal of guidance if they are
well chosen and arranged, and if they match with the facts they are
supposed to deal with.
In spite of this, and in spite of its constant balancing of contrary
factors, the book does not create an impression of moderation. On the
contrary, it is an impassioned declaration of faith. I think that it is a
personal attribute of Professor Llewellyn's that creates this impres-
sion, more than the substance of his position. What he holds he does
not hold with indifference, but with fervor. Though he is a scholar, he
does not think of scholarship as a discipline aloof from the practical
affairs of life. His advocacy is blunt, sometimes violent; he insists on
clarity, which makes unreal compromises (under the umbrella of a
generalization which the compromisers understand differently) im-
possible. He holds his views of the judicial process with an almost
desperate sense of their supreme significance to the pursuit of order
through law. And this sense transmits itself into his vocabulary and
his style.
The substance of these views has, I hope, appeared in the earlier
pages of this review. What has probably not appeared is the rather
strange impression which the book makes, as a whole, upon the reader.
This is due, I think, to an unusual combination of attributes. A highly
generalized study of a legal system and its disciplines represents its
object as an inert body, laid out and partly dissected. On the other
184. See Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928),
especially pp. 159 and 161. But he seems to have thought that there was Set
value in opinions. See Professor Llewellyn's anecdote of him, p. 391.
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hand, a careful study of a line of cases, or even of a larger field, can,
if it is well done, exhibit its object as a living body, with growth,
almost with actions, of its own. Professor Llewellyn has made a very
general study of the legal system, and has shown it, nevertheless, as
a living body. The individual and miscellaneous cases appear as
episodes in continuous processes, and the generalizations which they
illustrate are themselves modes of action for lawyers and judges.
This stress on action and process may account for the structure of
the book, which, at first sight, is peculiar. It is not organized accord-
ing to an analytical outline like a text, nor has it a succession of
chapters, each dealing with a different subject, like a theoretical
explanation. It is built, rather, around certain themes which occur
and recur like musical notes, sometimes alone, sometimes in varying
combinations. Such an organization is not easy to follow in an
intellectual discipline, however familiar it might be in literature. The
reader's difficulty is increased by the fact that Professor Llewellyn's
style is not lucid. He pays the reader the compliment on every page
of supposing that he is an expert, which everyone should appreciate,
however seldom he may deserve it. More important, the author's
thought is complex, and he is professionally unwilling either to talk
down to his readers or to water down his subject matter. Finally,
he is concerned with the facts and ideas that stand behind words,
and constantly chooses words, similes and metaphors that put these
facts and ideas before the reader, and not some loosely outlined
concept that also means a dozen other things. The resulting sentences
are vivid, interesting, and hard to follow.
It is probably the emphasis on action and process that has enabled
the author to accomplish several things at once with his book. It is,
first, an answer to those inside and outside the profession whose
criticisms are undermining faith in the courts. It is, second, a survey
of legal techniques in a precedent-system-not a last will and testa-
ment, as surveys are apt to be, but a prospectus calling for further
investment in the proved techniques that have emerged as an endur-
ing contribution to the law. It is, in the third place, a careful study,
partly of material specially chosen to illustrate particular points, and
partly of cases taken at random from the state reports; this is the
fundamental material out of which the author supports his conclusions
on the first two propositions. But one could also describe the book
in several other ways: it is a critique of current judicial process in
America; a practicing lawyer's sophisticated guide, especially in time
of trouble; a law teacher's manual of case-method (whatever he
teaches) ; and, not least, a judge's conscientious and technical adviser.
I do not doubt that it has other uses as well. But I think its greatest
merit is that it is as specific as it is possible to be with legal subject
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matter. Obviously the directions cannot be as concrete as those for
removing tonsils; just as obviously, general urgings for "improve-
ment" are a waste of paper if one assumes, as surely he can, that the
bar and bench collectively want to do a good job. The value of this
book is that it shows how.
PART III
In the first part of this review I usually, but not always, suppressed
the desire to add personal comments. A few of them still seem to be
worth the space these additional remarks will take.
First, I must admit that this book has opened my eyes to a truth
so obvious that it is embarrassing to acknowledge help in the matter.
This is, that the courts' daily creations-their slow, unnoticed accre-
tions-are more important for the law in the long run than the
spectacular innovating cases we all remember. Every man is entitled
to his plea in mitigation, and what has concealed this for me, I think,
is the large number of "footless appeals," as Professor Llewellyn
calls them somewhere. In these there is, let us say, the smallest
creation possible, so small that the advocate, if his eyes had been
clear, would have seen that he was wasting time and money. I think,
moreover, that it is difficult for law teachers to keep this clearly
before them because, with the present "comparative" system of
casebook construction, we build with cases from many jurisdictions
that, in the main, are not troubled by each other's authorities. The
line of cases in a single jurisdiction displays daily accumulating
creations best. 85 The proposition is a sobering one because, if my
suspicions are right, it is possible for students, even good ones, to miss
this point. I remember the shock I had some years ago when a
student, one of the best, told me that he had not really understood
case law until he took Constitutional Law and had to handle a large
number of cases decided by one court. This is not the place to discuss
corrective measures, but I suspect that some are needed.
Second, in reading over Parts I and II of this review I feel that the
situation-type may play an unduly large role in it. Certainly it seems
fair to say, as I have said, that it is the key concept underlying the
book; on the other hand, there is much that would stand without it
(e.g., the steadying factors, the leeways and much more which the
reader will recall). The apparent overemphasis results, in part, from
the fact that I have not summarized the author's explanations of and
comments upon the very numerous cases which he discusses in the
book. It was impossible to do this if the review was to be kept within
any reasonable limits. The omission, however, has had, perhaps, a
185. See the series of English fright cases in GREGORY & KALVEN, CASES ON
TORTS 860-80 (1959).
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collateral effect: the situation-type may appear to the reader as a
deus ex mchina, a heroic (but blank) concept with which the author
solves all his difficulties. I have countered this, in part, by including
the author's warnings about the misuses to which it is subject; for
the rest, the reader's doubts, if he has any, about the use of it would,
I think, be resolved by reading a few of the author's discussions of
specific cases or lines of cases. Finally, the reader, if he has not
examined the book, may doubt that he understands what this "situa-
tion-type" really means. It may help if I admit that I do not, that
I have only a tentative grasp of the concept. This is due, in part, to
the nature of the concept itself. It is a little like Kant's categorical
imperative, which, without any definite content of its own, neverthe-
less has important functional value in understanding ethical problems.
With such a concept, constant use, in a great variety of situations, is
the only path to understanding, and a solid understanding in conse-
quence is not quickly gained, nor is it gained by reading alone. Thus
the situation-type, though it is an important contribution to legal
thinking, and is well explained and illustrated in this book, can be
understood only when one has used it for himself.
Third, the fundamental importance of the thought embedded in the
following extract from Goldschmidt will, by this time, be clear:
Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can
take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its
right law. This is a natural law which is real, not imaginary; it
is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation
of what reason can recognize in the nature of man and of the life
conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal nor change-
less nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very cir-
cumstances of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in
uncovering and implementing this immanent law. 86
The reader will remember that this is the theoretical underpinning
for the situation-type, which in turn is a vital criterion of right law.
Now I know no more of Goldschmidt than this extract tells, which is
surely not enough to found a critique. Yet, some limited observations
seem to be justified.
The extract asserts that there is a "right law," for every fact
situation, that there is then right and wrong law-a statement about
values, not about facts. And it is fair to say also that it assumes that
men can know what law is right and what law is wrong, at least
sometimes. The statement and the assumption both are metaphysical
propositions, and very controversial ones. A professional philosopher
would have many questions to ask about this immanent law, which
is founded on "what reason can recognize in the nature of man and
186. P. 122. See also text accompanying note 63, supra.
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of the life conditions of the time and place." He might also be
troubled by the negative qualities-that is "not eternal nor changeless
nor everywhere the same."
What consequence would the demolition of this theory have upon
the situation-type and the other devices upon which Professor Llew-
ellyn has built? None, I think, so long as the reasoner believes that
men have knowledge of ethical truths which can be usefully applied
in a legal system. He could simply supply his own theory in place of
Goldschmidt's, and would probably not be greatly inconvenienced by
the change. Even the negative qualities are only ways of meeting
the problem of change, and while different ethical theories have
varying success in dealing with this problem, I think even the most
rigid of them now show an astonishing flexibility when they are
subjected to practical demands. Above all, the methodicaZ principle
of the situation-type, that light is to be sought by searching for the
typical facts in the situation and clearly distinguishing these from
the non-typical facts, would remain unchanged. The author's work,
in other words, does not fall if Goldschmidt's theory should succumb
to criticism. It happens to be the base he has chosen, though it is
not emphasized, but it is not absolutely required to support his other
positions.
Fourth, one of Professor Llewellyn's conclusions leads to some
interesting thought about a well-known saying of Justice Holmes:
"For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics.1 7 It is, as with many of Holmes' most
pregnant aphorisms, difficult to pin this down; it might mean only
that training in these sciences will become a part of the lawyer's
standard equipment. But it might mean that practitioners of these
sciences will decide what ends the law should reach and by what
means. Taken in the latter sense, I think Professor Llewellyn, for all
his devotion to Holmes, has shown how to refute it.
We may begin by saying that the black-letter man is not our choice.
Professor Llewellyn has, throughout the book, paid off his grudge
against the black-letter man. In fact, he shows that this need never
be our choice, that we need to be rid not only of the black-letter man,
but of the black-letter as well. But must we choose "the man of
statistics and the master of economics"? Justice Holmes seems to
be questioning the value of traditional legal training, and looking
forward to something different and better, and solidly based on the
sciences. I think that Professor Llewellyn's book has shown, whether
he intended it or not, that Holmes' pair of choices was insufficient,
187. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in CoLI.scTEi LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187
(1920).
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that the "man of the future" has turned out to be the lawyer still,
and that this is the way it ought to be. Economics and statistics,
along with other sciences, have become more useful to the law than
they were; they are oftener used, and with more telling effect, but
they remain the domain of the specialist, and the law, in its bulk, is
still made by counsellors, advocates, and judges. The sciences may
guide the situation-sense, and help the searcher find it for his case,
but it is still legal technique and legal technicians that control the
growth of the law. One of the author's most telling passages, I think,
is his strong defense of the unspecialized supreme court, which, in the
end, reduces all the experts to guides, and arrives at its own conclu-
sions about ends and means.188 The negative merits of the non-expert
court of last resort appear in its refusals to turn over its functions
automatically to green and untried scientific instruments. The book
under review is the best example of its positive merits.
But these are only a few of the paths which open out from this
book. The end of it all is, that it will stand reading, frequent re-
reading, and a lifetime of browsing, and repay all the study with
interest.
Comment-Harvey M. Johnsen*
My interest in Llewellyn's book is naturally from the judicial side.
He has done a notable job, I think, in his reminders, urgings and
challenges to the appellate bench as to the approaches and processes of
its opinion work.
In the book's concreteness and comprehensiveness, along with its
currency, it will have a value and an impact over the previous general
materials in the field. Also, Llewellyn's passion and provocativeness
give it something of a searing flame, as against the embering glow
of the writings, both lofty and unlofty, which have gone before.
His gathering and labeling of the many tools of the judicial work-
shop is a service that of itself is most worthwhile. These are things
which judges for the most part know that their tool chests contain,
but of which they do not often enough, perhaps, make a conscious
inventory in the routine performance of their work. Certainly, room
exists for some of these tools to be made to have a more objective
"feel," and so a smoother use, in many judges' hands.
I should hope that every judge of an appellate court will take the
time to read the book leisurely, and that the members of the court will
188. Quoted in text accompanying note 146, supra.
* Chief Judge, 8th Circuit, United States Court of Appeals.
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